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Introduction
The Clean Water Act of 1987 changed
dramatically the way that the nation’s $83.5
billion in wastewater treatment needs (to meet
population in year 2008) will be financed (U.S.
EPA, February 1989). The Construction Grants
Program that provided more than $57 billion to
local
governments
for
treatment
plant
construction since 1972 was phased out and
replaced by State Revolving Funds (SRFs). SRFs
are authorized to provide a range of loan
assistance to local governments for wastewater
treatment plant construction, estuary protection,
and non-point source pollution projects.
Congress created the SRF Program to develop financial capability at the state level as a
tradeoff to reduced federal commitment. As states
and local governments must increasingly find resources to compensate for federal retrenchment,
in the area of environmental protection as
elsewhere, SRFs could prove to be an important
new mechanism to help fill the gap between
investment needs and resources available. At the
same time, the move to SRFs increases state and
local financial responsibilities. Their ability to
sustain SRFs and to meet wastewater treatment
needs depends on the broader picture of resources
available and competing demands for those
resources. SRF’s effectiveness in meeting
wastewater treatment needs is also linked to the
regulatory and statutory framework for SRFs.
This article outlines the history of financing wastewater treatment facilities, provides an
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overview of the SRF program, and discusses
some of the issues that will affect the ability of
the SRFs to meet our nation’s wastewater
treatment needs.
Trends in Financing Wastewater Treatment
Plants
The federal government began investing
in wastewater treatment plant construction in the
1950s. Two factors supported a federal financial
role. First, the huge capital outlays associated
with the plants made it difficult for many local
governments to finance the facilities on their
own. In addition, the health and environmental
benefits of improving wastewater treatment are
not confined within local or state borders. When
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1956
authorized federal grants for the construction of
wastewater treatment plants, the small federal
role was considered necessary and important.
By 1972, however, Congress perceived
that state and local governments were not
investing enough money in wastewater
treatment plant construction, and as a result,
needs were growing rapidly. The Clean Water
Act passed that year included a much expanded
financing role for the federal government. The
Act authorized $18 billion in construction grants
to local governments through 1976. At that time,
Congress considered the federal financial
commitment a temporary subsidy of states to
meet the large and growing investment needs for
wastewater treatment.
The 1972 Clean Water Act also required
wastewater treatment plants to provide
secondary treatment of wastewater, further
increasing investment demands. While the
federal government

provided approximately $4 billion in grants each
year, it was not enough to solve the wastewater
problem as Congress had intended. Many local
governments, especially small communities, were
at the bottom of a long list of communities
applying for grant assistance. By 1980, EPA
estimated that governments would have to spend
$119 billion to meet the needs of all eligible
sewage facilities in the country. If stormwater
collection and treatment systems were included,
EPA estimated that another $112 billion would be
required (U.S. EPA, January
1981).
The federal budget concerns of the 1980s
caused Congress to look carefully at the relatively
large outlays of the Construction Grants Program.
At the same time, the grant program was
criticized because the availability of “free” money
caused local governments to undervalue less
capital-intensive,
and
sometimes
more
appropriate, solutions to meeting their wastewater
treatment needs.
Furthermore, responsibility for paying for
the facilities was removed from the primary beneficiaries, as federal dollars were paying for a large
percentage of local wastewater treatment
facilities. As a result, local governments were
underinvesting in operation and maintenance.
They did not have the same incentives to protect
their investment as if local funds had paid for
plants. In fact, this large-scale underinvestment
was confirmed in a 1981 report by the U.S.
General Accounting Office (U.S. General
Accounting Office, 1981). GAO’s report
indicated that half of the municipal treatment
plants studied were not charging users enough to
cover operation and maintenance costs. Only
eight percent of the plants were setting aside
funds for plant replacement. Furthermore, sixtythree percent of plants surveyed indicated that
they would request additional funding from the
federal government for plant replacement.
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In the 1987 amendments to the Clean
Water Act, Congress decided to create a
permanent source of funding at the state level to
pay for construction of wastewater treatment
plants. The Construction Grants Program would
phase Out over four years, to be replaced by
State Revolving Funds. The SRFs are authorized
to provide various types of loan assistance to
local governments. Uses of the funds are
expanded from those authorized in the
Construction Grant Program to include estuary
protection and non-point source pollution
control, in addition to financing construction of
wastewater treatment facilities.
Recognizing the continued importance
of the federal role in ensuring adequate
wastewater treatment, Congress authorized
federal capitalization grants of $8.4 billion until
1994. States are required to contribute a 20
percent match for each capitalization grant
awarded. The local financial obligation is larger
than under the Construction Grants Program as
they must repay assistance offered through the
SRF. However, interest rates are subsidized and
costs eligible for assistance are expanded from
those authorized under the Construction Grants
Program.
Congress restricted the use of the federal
capitalization grants to ensure that secondary
treatment requirements of the Clean Water Act
were met as a priority. In addition, reporting and
monitoring requirements were added to the
authorizing legislation to protect the federal
investment and to ensure the financial integrity
of the SRFs. The two most important reporting
requirements are the Intended Use Plan and
Annual Report. States must submit an Intended
Use Plan each year outlining how the funds will
be used, leveraging plans, and other important
details about projects to be funded. At the end of
the year, states must submit Annual Reports with
information on how the money was actually
used and the financial status of the fund.

EPA has attempted to reduce the burden of
reporting on the states by requiring a one-time
administrative agreement, setting forth the general
operating procedures of the fund. The agreements
do not have to be revised each year unless states
change the general structure of their programs.
Congress intended states to develop programs to meet their own needs with a minimum of
intervention by the federal government. As a
result, EPA will have a different role vis a vis
state and local governments than it had in the
Construction Grants Program. EPA’s objective is
to act as a facilitator of state programs. The
agency has provided a range of guidance
documents and training seminars for states, to
assist in program development and financial
management. After 1994, when the capitalization
grants end, EPA’s role will diminish further.

strong cities so that they will participate in the
SRF Program.
EPA expects that the flexible statutory
and regulatory framework will result in state
programs uniquely structured to meet needs
faced by particular states. In fact, as states have
begun to finalize their programs, important
differences have emerged. For example, financial
strategies differ based on demands for resources.
States with large investment needs, such as New
York, have implemented aggressive plans to
leverage additional money for the fund by
issuing bonds secured by the federal
capitalization grants. Other states that do not
have a large demand for wastewater treatment
investment, including several mid-Western
states, do not plan to leverage additional
resources.

In contrast to the diversity in the
structure of SRFs, trends in the use of funds have
States are slowly developing their State emerged, both in the types of projects funded and
Revolving Loan Fund Programs. While many the communities that receive assistance. First,
states had similar programs in place before the very few states have offered assistance for non1987 Clean Water Act, others were less experi- point source pollution projects and none for
enced in administering a revolving loan program. estuary protection. Washington is one of the few
Most states have received two or more capitaliza- states that has established a “set-aside” policy for
tion grants; one state, Tennessee, has received non-point and estuary projects to ensure that a
four grants. At the end of Fiscal Year 1990, all 50 minimum percentage of SRF resources are spent
states and Puerto Rico had received at least one for these needs. While many states plan to devote
capitalization grant. However, many state SRF resources to these needs at some point in the
programs are not in final form. States created SRF future, wastewater treatment needs in most states
frameworks in order to secure capitalization far surpass needs identified in the areas of nongrants but plan to implement details of the point source pollution and estuary protection.
However, it is likely that states underestimate
program’ over time.
non-point and estuary needs. These programs are
One reason for the slow start in new and the extent of problems facing states is
implementing programs is that it was necessary not clear. In addition, non-point and estuary
for states to market the SRFs to local pollution have been difficult to address due to
governments that were accustomed to the idea of the lack of focus on non-point pollution sources
federal grant subsidies. States had to convince in the past. Non-point sources are significant
communities that their only option for EPA contributors to estuary pollution problems. As a
subsidies henceforth was loan assistance. Some result, states are more likely to direct the fund
states have offered additional special incentives to towards wastewater treatment facilities. While
cities to encourage their application for SRF SRFs are presented by EPA as an important
assistance. To improve their loan portfolio for source of funding for non-point and estuary
leveraging purposes, for example, states may protection projects, it may be necessary to
examine alternatives to help meet these needs.
offer low interest rates to financially
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A second issue that has been raised
regarding the use of funds is that a
disproportionate number of the communities
receiving assistance are large cities, given the
percentage of all cities that are large nationally.
This may be due, in part, to the fact that SRFs are
limited to providing loan assistance. States
cannot provide grants through the SRFs. As with
any loan, communities that are most able to repay
are most competitive for the limited SRF
resources. Reinforcing this situation is the need
for states that leverage to establish an attractive
loan portfolio so that they can issue bonds at the
most favorable rates. Providing loan assistance to
marginally qualified communities can damage
states’ ability to leverage funds in the bond
market. In addition to the increased potential for
loan defaults, the subsidy to less advantaged
communities might have to be higher, thereby
reducing the rate at which the fund “revolves” or
replenishes. Finally, Congress established a 20year limit on loan terms, which has an important
impact on user charges. The 20-year loan term
reduces the ability of less advantaged
communities to qualify for assistance and is
considered low in comparison with 28-30 year
loan terms that exist for some state assistance
programs for wastewater treatment facilities.
The “small community problem” in
securing finance for wastewater treatment
facilities is not a new one. Under the
Construction Grants Program, small towns
received many fewer grants than they should
have, given their number and population. In
many cases, this is because small communities
could not raise enough money to cover their
share of the construction costs. In 1981, EPA
reported that communities under 5,000 were
particularly affected by a disparity in grant
awards based on community size (U.S. EPA,
January 198 1). The communities under 5,000
received only 55 percent of the grants awarded
even though they represented 80 percent of all
communities. Furthermore, they received only 12
percent of the dollar value of all awards, although
they contained 31 percent of the national
population.

impacts on small communities of the unbalanced
distribution of federal subsidies is not well understood. However, the disparity could be worsened
under the SRF Program due to the potential bias
in the loan program toward providing assistance
to wealthier communities.
Other Factors Affecting the Ability of SRFs to
Meet Needs
Several other factors will affect the
success of SRFs. Some of these factors raise
issues that relate to the statutory and regulatory
framework for SRFs and others deal with broader
concerns.
Statutory and regulatory issues that affect
the SRF deal primarily with requirements that
increase state administrative costs or project costs
for local governments. Among these are requirements applicable to all projects that receive
federal funds, such as applying Davis-Bacon
wage provisions to treatment works construction.
Other requirements are specific to the Clean
Water Act and have been carried forward from
the Construction Grants Program, such as
requiring that applicants for assistance study
opportunities for using innovative and alternative
treatment technologies.
States argue that these requirements increase costs unnecessarily, precluding less advantaged communities from receiving SRF assistance
and requiring states to offer higher subsidies to
offset the costs of federal requirements. States
view SRFs as their own and argue that they
should be allowed to develop programs to meet
their particular needs without federal intervention.
On the other hand, the federal investment in the
SRFs and broader interest in maintaining their
financial integrity support the view that led
Congress to place certain restrictions on the use
of funds. Most of the restrictions, in fact, are tied
to the capitalization grants and not to state
contributions or to interest earned on the fund.

Another statutory requirement that affects
the ability of SRFs to meet wastewater needs is
the limitation on offering assistance to treatment
The cumulative health and environmental works
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that are publicly-owned. Therefore, privatelyowned wastewater treatment plants are not
eligible for the same subsidies as publicly-owned
plants. This restriction and the disincentives to
private investment that were introduced in the Tax
Reform Act of 1986, such as lengthened
depreciation schedules, reduce incentives for
private companies to invest in wastewater
treatment plants. While private operation and
maintenance of plants is allowed as a condition of
the assistance, even partial private ownership of a
plant disqualifies them from SRF assistance. This
is particularly discouraging given the vast
investment needs that currently exist and raises
questions regarding the ability to meet secondary
treatment requirements of plants that are currently
owned by private companies.
The Broader Context for Financing Under the
Clean Water Act
The ability of states and local
governments to meet the new financial
responsibilities associated with the move from
Construction Grants to SRFs can only be
understood in the context of overall trends in
environmental spending. Increasing demands on
state and local resources will mean that demands
for wastewater investment will have to compete
with a growing number of other demands for
environmental expenditures.

fact that EPA grants to states have decreased. In
1982, EPA grants made up 49 percent of state
expenditures for water quality programs, but by
1986, had fallen to 33 percent of state budgets for
these programs (U.S. EPA, May 1990). Two
factors indicate a more serious state financing
problem. First, these data do not include the
impacts of phasing out the Construction Grant
Program. Second, EPA grants as a percentage of
state budgets have decreased in other program
areas as well. For hazardous and solid waste
programs, for example, EPA grants fell from 76
percent of state budgets in 1982 to 40 percent in
1986.
The impact of increased financial
demands on the ability of local governments to
meet waste-water investment needs is also
important. If local governments cannot meet the
local share of costs for wastewater treatment
plant construction, SRF funds will not be used or
will only be used by a small group of wealthier
communities. EPA’s study of expenditures for
each level of government projects that local
governments’ share of total environmental
spending will increase from 76 percent in 1981,
to 87 percent in 2000. In constant dollars, local
government expenditures on the environment will
rise from $26.3 billion in 1981 to $53.7 billion in
2000.
Summary

EPA examined trends in spending by each
Establishment of the SRF Program has
level of government, and found that, if current
trends continue, EPA’s share of total environ- met one of Congress’ principal objectives in
mental expenditures will fall from 18 percent in amending the financing procedures in the Clean
1981 to 8 percent in 2000 (U.S. EPA, May 1990). Water Act, reducing the federal responsibility for
While this study projected that states’ share of wastewater treatment plant construction. From an
environmental expenditures will stay about the efficiency perspective, local investment decisions
same overall, a study of state expenditures indi- will probably improve as a result of the move
cates large funding shortfalls for water quality from grants to loans. Local governments have a
programs (U.S. EPA, October 1989). In the area greater incentive to adequately operate and
of water quality management, including maintain their facilities, if the pressure on user
expenditures associated with the Safe Drinking charges is not too great. Also, less capitalWater Act and the Clean Water Act, EPA’s Office intensive solutions to wastewater treatment needs
of Water estimated a state funding shortfall which may be sought where appropriate. However, the
increases yearly and will reach approximately success of SRFs in meeting authorized needs
depends on a number of factors, internal and
$409 million in 1992.
The state shortfall is partially due to the external to the fund. Some of the limita28
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